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CAPACITY ASSURANCE PLANS
I. INTRODUCTION
Public opposition to the siting of new hazardous waste treatment
and disposal facilities is escalating.' Since 1984 only one new
solidification and landfill disposal facility has been issued a permit and
put into operation.! In addition, capacity to manage and dispose of our
nation's hazardous -wastes at some commercial treatment and disposal
facilities is dwindling.3 These concerns fuel one of the most contentious
1. See Dan Hopey, Communities in State Resist Incinerators, THE PITTSBURGH
PRESS, Mar. 17, 1992 at Al (reporting that Protect Environment and Children
Everywhere (PEACE) gathered 22,000 petition signatures in opposition to a proposal
to build a hazardous waste incinerator in Clarion County, Pennsylvania); Jim
Massie, Activist Says Incinerator Will Turn Ohio Into 'Pay Toilet', COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Nov. 22, 1991 at C5; Bob Downing, Hard Ball Over Hazardous Wastes
Toledo Area Dump Owner and Opponents Pull Out Stops, AKRON BEACON J., Apr. 9,
1990, at Cl; T. C. Brown, Fingerhut Proposal Could Block Incinerator, PLAIN DEALER,
Jan. 30, 1992 at C3.
Arizona faced intense public opposition to a permitted incinerator to be operated
by Environmental Services Corp. (ENSCO). Jim Bishop Jr., Arizona's Environment:
Now Is The Hour In Places Like The Verde Valley, The Public Is Getting Very Hot
Under The Collar, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 1989, at C7. In two years, Arizona
paid $44 million to ENSCO to breach its contract to allow the incinerator. Pat
Flannery, In 2 Weeks, ENSCO Is Out Of State Arizona Must Find Way To Meet Rules
On Waste, THE PHOENIX GAZETTE, Sept. 10, 1991, at Al.
Similarly within the past two years, North Carolina, Massachusetts and
Mississippi killed plans for siting incineration facilities in their respective states.
Paul Kemezis, States Fight For Rights, CHEMICAL WK., Aug. 21, 1991, at 56.
Texas Governor Richards sought to adopt a two-year moratorium on issuing
permits to incineration and injection well projects. Texas Governor Richards Halts
Permit Process; To Seek Hazwaste Moratorium, HAZARDOUS WASTE BUS., Feb. 27,
1991, at 3.
2. Kemezis, supra note 1.
3. Michigan and Illinois project less than ten years of capacity at existing sites.
Id. In one recent study, thirteen states were found to have shortfalls in incinerator
capacity through 1995 and in landfill and sludge treatment capacity through 2009.
SHARON N. GREEN, PLANNING FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CAPACITY: LESSONS FROM THE
NORTHEAST STATES (1990). The Environmental Protection Agency found national
shortages in incinerator capacity. Interstate Transportation of Solid Waste, 1991:
Hearings Before Subcom. on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 80, 88-89 (1991)
[hereinafter Interstate Transportation Hearings] (Statement of Don. R. Clay,
Assistant Administrator for Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,
Environmental Protection Agency). But see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
HAZARDOUS WASTE: FUTURE AVAILABILITY OF AND NEED FOR TREATMENT CAPACITY
ARE UNCERTAIN (1988) [hereinafter GAO, TREATMENT CAPACITY].
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issues facing the United States today: Where should we treat and
dispose of our nation's hazardous waste?
Of the 275 million tons4 of hazardous waste5 generated in the
United States per year, only a small percentage is disposed of in off-site
management facilities.6 The hazardous waste disposal market for this
small percentage is national in scope. All fifty states export some
hazardous waste to other states, and forty-eight states import some
hazardous waste from other states.! Moreover a plethora of hazardous
substances exist which require specific technologies for treatment. The
average state exports hazardous waste to nineteen other states and
utilizes twelve different treatment and disposal technologies in those
states.8 As new commercial landfills and incinerators are the two most
difficult management/disposal facilities to site,9 the interstate hazardous
waste disposal debate largely revolves around the siting of these
facilities.
4. GAO, TREATMENT CAPACITY, supra note 3, at 2.
5. Congress defined "hazardous waste" as:
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity,
concentration, or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics may
(A) cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or
otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5)(A)&(B) (1988).
6. Review of EPA's Capacity Assurance Program, 1991: Hearings Before Subcom.
on Env't., Energy, and Natural Resources of the House Committee on Government
Operations, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1991) [hereinafter CAPs Review Hearings]
(Statement of Sue R. Robertson, Chief, Land Div., Alabama Dept. of Environmental
Management). In 1987, the EPA estimated less than two percent (3.8 million tons)
of hazardous waste were transported across state borders. Interstate Transportation
Hearings, supra note 3, at 78.
7. NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASS'N, INTERCHANGE OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE MANAGEMENT SERVICES AMONG STATES AND THE EPA's CAPACITY ASSURANCE
PROGRAM (1991).
8. Id. at 8, 12.
9. "According to survey results, landfills and incinerators are harder to site
successfully than are treatment facilities." NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE
COMMISSION ON ToxIc SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS WASTES, HAzARDouS WASTE
FACILITY SITING A NATIONAL SURVEY 40 (1987) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
COMMISSION]; see also Kemezis, supra note 1.
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Concerned with the states' inability to site newer, safer hazardous
waste management and disposal facilities in the face of intense public
opposition,0 Congress enacted the Capacity Assurance Plan (CAP)
provision in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act."
The provision requires states to enter into a cooperative agreement with
the Environmental Protection Agency whereby the state assures that it
will have adequate capacity for the treatment and disposal of the
hazardous wastes which are reasonably expected to be generated within
the state over the next twenty years. 2
The Environmental Protection Agency required the states to submit
a written plan which described the amount of hazardous waste
generated in the state; the total treatment and disposal capacity located
in the state; and, if necessary, the state's plans to create additional
capacity or to minimize waste generation. The provision had several
problems. First neither the statutory provision nor the EPA's
implementation of it specified the level of capacity desired: capacity at
the national, regional or state level. Second the EPA did not enforce
sanctions against noncomplying states. As a result, the CAP provision
failed to compel the states to effectively deal with the siting crisis.'3
Thus far, the provision has exacerbated tension and animosity among
the states. 4
10. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
11. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988)).
12. Id.
13. Since the provision's enactment in 1986, no new commercial hazardous waste
landfills have been sited. Kemezis, supra note 1, at 56.
14. See South Carolina ex rel. Medlock v. Reilly,[1992] 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20, 101 (D.D.C. May 7, 1992)(South Carolina sought an order by the Court that
the defendant shall not provide or reserve federal funds for remedial actions in the
state of North Carolina); New York v. Reilly, 143 F.R.D. 487 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)(New
York sought to compel defendant to perform his non-discretionary duties under 42
U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(1993)). See also New York State Sues the EPA Over Interstate
Hazwaste Disposal Regulation, HAzARDous WASTE Bus., Jan. 29, 1992, at 3; New
York Wants Superfund CAP Enforced, Demands Sanctions, PESTICIDE & ToxIc
CHEMICAL NEws, Dec. 25, 1991, available in WESTLAW, Pts-News Database; Paul
Kemezis, New York Takes Strong Stance on Hazardous Waste Imports, CHEMICAL
WK., Jan. 8, 1992, at 8 [hereinafter Kemezis, Strong Stance].
North Carolina was ousted from its regional group for failing to meet the
milestone of siting an incinerator. Andrew Loesel, Border Battles: States Are Hoping
to Gain greater Control Of Waste Crossing Their Borders, and Congress May Be
Willing To Let Them, 240 CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., Nov. 18, 1991 at SR7
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Thirteen states have commercial hazardous waste landfills. 5 These
states reacted by attempting to protect the remaining commercial
landfill and incinerator capacity located in their respective states, and
to force equitable distribution of treatment capacity. 6
New York State is one such state. In particular, Western New York
houses one of the few commercial hazardous waste land disposal
facilities in the United StatesY New York State attempted to comply
with the CAP requirement by entering into an agreement with several
of the Northeastern states. However, because officials believed that New
York was accepting too much waste in return for too little capacity from
out-of-state management facilities, New York declined to enter into an
agreement with the Northeastern states. 8 Also, Alabama, Indiana and
South Carolina, among others, have attempted to ban hazardous waste
from exporting states that do not have comparable treatment
facilities. 9 Alabama also enacted a differential tax structure charging
$40 per ton for in-state hazardous wastes and $112 per ton for out-of-
[hereinafter Border Battles]; Michael Weisskopf, Carolina's Clash Over Toxic Waste:
Sign of a Nationwide Problem, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1991, at A7.
Thirteen states have banded together to form the "States For Responsible and
Equitable Waste Management." Their objective is to push for tougher federal action
to penalize exporters, increasing waste disposal fees, and even banning waste from
certain large scale exporters. Elizabeth Ross, 'Importer' States Rebel Against
Hazardous Waste, Thirteen Band Together Demand Federal Action To Penalize
'Exporter' States, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 25, 1990, at 7.
15. Border Battles, supra note 14 (crediting the National Solid Wastes
Management Association as the source of this number). A more recent estimate
states that sixteen states house a national total of twenty-one hazardous waste
commercial landfills. Respondent's Brief at 10, Chemical Waste Management v.
Hunt, 112 S.Ct. 2009 (1992) (No. 91-471).
16. The states have attempted to restrict out of state hazardous waste to lessen
the inequity felt by its citizens more than to preserve capacity. Alabama's Emelle
facility has capacity that will last until the "next millennium" as ChemWaste owns
2,700 acres at Emelle and fills about 2-3 acres per year. Mary Powers, Alabama Will
Challenge CWMAttempt to Provide Capacity to Mississippi, HAZARDOUS WASTE Bus.,
Dec. 30, 1992, at 1.
17. Department of Environmental Conservation, New York State, Capacity
Assurance Plan (1989).
18. GREEN, supra note 3, at 89; Kemezis, Strong Stance, supra note 14.
19. Border Battles, supra note 14.
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state wastes.0 The Supreme Court2' struck down the bans and
differential fees' as unconstitutional for violating the Commerce
Clause.
Courts and commentators agree that the Commerce Clause does not
permit the states to interfere with the free flow of interstate hazardous
waste commerce.' The Supreme Court also held that the CAP
20. Id.
21. National Solid Waste Management v. Alabama Dept. of Environmental
Management, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991);
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991).
22. Chemical Waste Management, [nc. v. Hunt, 112 S.Ct. 2009 (1992). While
outright bans and differential fees have been held unconstitutional, South Carolina
and New York have brought suits to compel the Environmental Protection Agency to
enforce sanctions against states which have failed to reach their milestones. The
United States District Court of the District of Columbia dismissed South Carolina's
case for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. South Carolina
ex rel. Medlock v. Reilly [19921, 23 Envt]. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20, 101 (D.D.C. May
7, 1992); see also U.S. Court Dismisses South Carolina's Suit Against EPA Over CAPs,
HAzARDous WASTE Bus., June 3, 1992, at 1. The New York suit withstood motions
for dismissal. However, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of New York noted its concerns over whether, upon further discovery, New York will
be able to present sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
New York v. Reilly, 143 F.R.D. 487 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); see also State Had Standing To
Sue To Compel EPA To Act, NAT. L.J., November 16, 1992 at 36.
Some states have established hazardous waste management fees that do not
discriminate on basis of origin. E.g., TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.136
(West 1992).
23. See generally Gerard M. McCabe, Comment, The Validity of the State Symmetry
Requirements Banning Hazardous Waste From Environmentally Indolent States, 10
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 169 (1991)(discussing the use of taxes for a disincentive
to exporting states); Ray Vaughan, Toxic Destiny: Changing Alabama's Future as a
Hazardous Waste Dumping Ground, 43 ALA. L. REV. 75 (1991)(advocating
condemnation of Emelle facility, the United States' largest and Alabama's only
landfill); Troy Fitzgerald, The Constitutionality of Utah's Hazardous Waste Disposal
Fee, 6 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 279 (1992)(discussing constitutionality of differential fees);
Carol Watson, Waste Not, Want Not or How Alabama Went To Bat With an
Additional Fee on Imported Hazardous Waste and Didn't Strike Out Under the
Commerce Clause, Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So.2d 1367 (Ala.
1991), 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 645 (1992); B. J. Wynne HI & Terri Hamby,
Interstate Waste: A Key Issue in Resolving the National Capacity Crisis, 32 S. TEX.
L.J. 601 (1991); Russell A. Berland, State and Local Attempts To Restrict the
Importation of Solid and Hazardous Waste: Overcoming the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 465 (1992); Kenneth G. Cole, Hunt v. CWM- Alabama
Attempts To Spread the Nation's Hazardous Waste Disposal Burden by Imposing a
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provision is not an express authorization from Congress that the states
may impede the hazardous waste market.' Caps on the level of
hazardous waste that a state will allow the landfill to accept; fees,
evenhandedly applied to in-state and out-of-state hazardous waste; and
per mile tax on transported hazardous waste throughout the state are
the few constitutionally permissible measures that the states may use.'
However, these measures do little to enforce equitable distribution of
hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities. While the CAP
provision could be an efficient tool to address equity concerns, the EPA's
most recent directive suggests that inequity in the disposal of hazardous
waste will continue. Furthermore, this implementation of the CAP
provision will magnify the already existing inequities and force Western
New York to become the nation's hazardous waste dump.
This article summarizes the issues surrounding the interstate
hazardous waste controversy and discusses the CAP provision as a
mechanism to resolve these issues. Part I of this article summarizes the
arguments for continuing an uninhibited hazardous waste market as
well as the arguments for the equitable distribution of treatment
capacity Part II of this article describes the CAP requirement, the
Congressional intent, and the EPA's implementation of it. This part also
discusses the problems with the requirement and the EPA's subsequent
revisal of the requirement. Finally, Part III discusses the legal
restraints which prevent states from forcing equitable distribution of
hazardous waste facilities. Part III also argues that the EPA's revisal
.to the requirement does not adequately address this concern and as a
result, Western New York will be forced to accept hazardous waste from
across the nation.
II. INTERSTATE HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROVERSY
The interstate hazardous waste debate reflects the tension between
the equitable distribution of capacity and the creation of sufficient
treatment capacity. The Environmental Protection Agency perceives a
Jenkins, Constitutionally Mandated Southern Hospitality: National Solid Wastes
Management Association and Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Alabama
Department of Environmental Management, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1003 (1991); Christine
M. Fixl, Hazardous Waste and Partial Import Bans: An Environmentally Sound
Exception To The Commerce Clause, 3 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 149 (1992).
24. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
25. Id.; Cole, supra note 23, at 1233-42; Watson, supra note 23.
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treatment capacity. The Environmental Protection Agency perceives a
number of goals in addressing the problem. These include ensuring: the
equitable distribution of treatment capacity; the creation of capacity that
is protective of human health and the environment; access to that
capacity for all generators; and waste management that is cost
effective.' The following section describes the hazardous waste market
and the reasons for continuing an uninhibited market as well as the
issues involving the equitable distribution of treatment capacity.
Finally, the section concludes with a summary of the solutions to public
opposition and reasons for their failure.
A. Hazardous Waste Market
The 275 million tons of hazardous waste generated in the United
States every year originate from a variety of industries.27 Particular
types of wastes are generated in volumes ranging from a few tons
annually to several million tons annually.' There are nineteen
treatment technologies available that meet the health and safety
requirements unique to the wastes.' Nationwide, there are
approximately 4,700 facilities operating under federal permits
authorizing the treatment, storage and disposal of some form of
hazardous waste; these facilities contain approximately 81,000 distinct
waste management units." While numerous treatment facilities exist,
most states do not house facilities to treat and dispose of every type of
26. Interstate Transportation Hearings, supra note 3, at 83 (statement of Don R.
Clay, Assistant Administrato For Solid Waste and Emergency Response,
Environmental Protection Agency).
27. Every state has agriculture and industry which generate a variety of
hazardous wastes. See NAT'L SOLID WASTES MGMT. AsS'N. INTERCHANGE OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SERVICES AMONG STATES (1990).
28. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioner,
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (No. 91-471).
29. See STANDARD HANDBOOK OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT AND DISPOSAL
(Harry M. Freeman ed., 1989); NATL. SOLID WASTES MGMT. ASS'N., supra note 27.
30. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE NATION'S HAZARDOUS WASTE
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AT A CROSSROADS: THE RCRA IMPLEMENTATION STUDY 7
(1990).
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waste that its residents and industry generate. 1
Commentators argue that the national market for hazardous waste
is necessarily integrated and interdependent.32 The following reasons
support this contention. Building treatment and disposal facilities
capable of handling every type of waste generated in the state is not
economically efficient or feasible.' The Department of Justice notes,
"[iun many cases, treatment or disposal facilities are so capital intensive
that their economic viability depends upon the fact that there are only
a few of them in the country."' In further support of this argument,
the Department of Justice notes that the land disposal pretreatment
regulations intensify the specialization of the hazardous waste
market." The regulations - encouraging incineration and recycling of
hazardous waste - require more technically complex and costly
treatment. Small generators cannot afford to treat their wastes on
31. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl.
Management, 910 F.2d 713, 717 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2800 (1990);
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GENERATION AND CAPACITY A PROFILE OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT IN EPA REGION IV (1989); see also ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, SUMMARY REPORT OF CAPACITY AT COMMERCIAL FACILITIES
(1989) [hereinafter SUMMARY REPORT].
32. Brief for Amici Curiae Hazardous Waste Treatment Council and the National
Solid Wastes Management Ass'n at 5, Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt,
112 S.Ct. 2009 (1992) (No. 91-471); see United States Amicus Curiae Brief at 10-11,
Chemical Waste Management (No. 91-471).
33. The Hawkins Point landfill, located in Maryland, exemplifies this. It closed
in part because it could not compete financially with commercial facilities in other
states. Richard N. L. Andrews, Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: State Approaches,
in DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLITICS AND POLICY 117, 122 (Charles E.
Davis & James P. Lester, eds., 1988). Iowa recently considered establishing a long-
term storage facility in the State to serve in-state needs. Based on the small amount
of waste the facility would handle, the per ton storage cost would have been several
times greater than the cost of existing out-of-state disposal. United States Amicus
Curiae Brief at 10, Chemical Waste Management (No. 91-471) (citing ALEX BROWN &
SONS, ENVIRONMENT SERVICES GROUP, HAZARDOUS WASTE: LAND DISPOSAL UPDATE
7 (1989)).
34. United States Amicus Curiae Brief at 10, Chemical Waste Management (No.
91-471).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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site, nor do they possess the technical expertise to do so." Finally, the
existence of a national market for hazardous waste contributes to the
development of innovative technologies and advanced facilities.38
The prevalence of interstate dependence in the hazardous waste
market is, perhaps, best evidenced by the capacity assurance plans. The
states' submissions showed the following patterns of interstate transport
of hazardous waste: thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia are
net exporters, thirteen states are net importers, and only ten states and
the District of Columbia did not have any imports.39 Although the
interstate hazardous waste market is complex and national in scope, the
equitable distribution of treatment capacity must be addressed. The
following sections highlight the concerns of communities threatened with
hosting a hazardous waste treatment facility.
B. Public Opposition and Equity Concerns
Public opposition to the siting of hazardous waste facilities as well
as other locally unwanted land uses (LULUs), such as state prisons and
institutions, is commonly referred to as the "not in my backyard"
(NIMBY) syndrome. While the NIMBY syndrome concerned academics
and state officials in the 1970's and early 1980s,' ° it has only recently
received the attention of Congress.41  Commentators have since
37. Id.
38. Brief of Amici Curiae Hazardous Waste Treatment Council and National Solid
Wastes Management Association at 5, Chemical Waste Management (No. 91-471).
39. CAPs Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 187 (statement of Sylvia K. Lowrence,
Director, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Environmental Protection
Agency); see also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE Toxics RELEASE
INVENTORY: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 1987 (1989); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, 1985 NATIONAL BIENNIAL REPORT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATORS AND
TREATMENT, STORAGE AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES REGULATED UNDER RCRA (1989).
40. Michael O'Hare, Not On My Block You Don't: Facility Siting and The Strategic
Importance Of Compensation, 25 PUBLIC POLICY 407 (1977); Frank J. Popper, Siting
LULUs, 47 PLANNING 12 (1981); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SITING
OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION (1979); see
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, STATE DECISION-1VAKERS GUIDE TO
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT (1977).
41. Congress responded to the growing NIMBY syndrome by enacting the
following:
The President shall not provide any remedial actions pursuant to this section
unless the state in which the release occurs first enters into an agreement with
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contributed much literature analyzing the NIMBY syndrome. From this
body of literature, this section summarizes the salient issues concerning
the NIMBY syndrome.
Fear characterizes the NIMBY syndrome." "Opposition is rooted
in the fears of major and long-term risks posed by facilities to the health
and welfare of the surrounding community."" However, the risk
perceived is not always the equivalent of the actual risk." Memories
of Love Canal, New York and Times Beach, Missouri color the public's
perception of modern hazardous waste management facilities.45 The
public may confuse the dumps of our recent past with the newer, safer
disposal facilities equipped with liners, leachate collection systems and
the President providing assurances deemed adequate by the President that...(B)
the state will assure the availability of a hazardous waste disposal facility
acceptable to the President and in compliance with the requirements of subtitle
C of the Solid Waste Disposal Act for any necessary offsite storage, destruction,
treatment, or secure disposition of the hazardous substances.
Comprehensive, Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, § 104(c)(3), 94 Stat. 2767, 2775-76 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
9604(c)(9)).
Unfortunately, this provision was largely ignored until the enactment of the
Superfimd Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.
42. KENT E. PORTNEY, SITING HAZARDOUs WASTE TREATMENT FACILITIES: THE
NIMBY SYNDROME 1-5 (1991); DAVID MORELL & CHRISTOPHER MAGORIAN, SITING
HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES: LOCAL OPPOSITION AND THE MYTH OF PREEMPTION
22-23 (1982); AUDREY M. ARMOUR, SITING OF LOCALLY UNWANTED LAND USES:
TOWARDS A COOPERATIVE APPROACH 27 (1990).
43. MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra note 42, at 22 (quoting U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES AND
PUBLIC OPPOSITION iii (1979)).
Little experience-based data exists [sic], however, on the long-term performance
of (clay liners and covers] technology requirements in preventing waste
migration. Although at least one company producing liner and cover material
estimates that the material will last hundreds of years, EPA and others believe
that permanent containment of wastes is not possible and that leaking will
occur at some time after the 30-year post-closure period.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE FUNDING OF POSTCLOSURE
LIABILITIES REMAINS UNCERTAIN 3 (1990) [hereinafter GAO, POSTCLOSURE
LuBILITIES].
The extent of the risk to human health and the environment is unknown. Id.
44. MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra note 42, at 23; PORTNEY, supra note 42, at 38-41.
45. See generally, MICHAEL R. EDELSTEIN, CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES, THE
SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF PERSISTENT TOxIC EXPOSURE 170 (1988).
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groundwater monitoring systems.46
The opposition to the siting of hazardous waste management
facilities, in part, is due to the nuisance it creates. For example, a waste
facility requires heavy truck traffic, is potentially accompanied by odor,
noise and unsightliness." Also, the siting of a waste facility usually
will lower property values.48
Another potent force behind the NIMBY syndrome is the
"perception of injustice, of exploitation, of unfairness."4 The public is
more adverse to hosting wastes from all over a region than from the
community itself." The implementation of the capacity assurance
requirement and the recent Supreme Court holdings that bans on
imported waste5 and differential fees5 are unconstitutional magnify
the perception of inequity. Host communities continue to be threatened
with the possibility of becoming the nation's dump.5 Related to the
perception of inequity is the actual inequitable distribution of benefits
and costs accompanied with the siting of hazardous waste facilities. The
46. MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra note 42, at 22-23; PORTNEY, supra note 42, at 41.
47. MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra note 42, at 23.
48. CAPs Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 3 (Statement of Representative
Clinger):
("Moving away from the potential health risks, let me translate the practical
economic effect of a facility of this nature. Real estate values in the area have
already plummeted, and tourism and outdoor recreation will suffer. As the
local economic infrastructure crumbles with the erosion of the tax base,
hundreds of jobs could be lost.")
49. David Morell, Siting and The Politics of Equity, in RESOLVING LOCATIONAL
CONFLICT 117, 120 (Robert W. Lake ed., 1987); PORTNEY, supra note 42 at 120-23.
50. Morell, supra note 49, at 120; MARY J. HOUGHTON, NATIONAL GOVERNORS'
ASSOCIATION, VOLUME IV: SITING NEW TREATMENT AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES 21
(1989); VIRGINIA BECKER, NATIONAL GOVERNORS' As'N, LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING
INTERSTATE DISPOSAL 3 (1989); see LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 40
(finding on-site facilities easier to site than off-site facilities).
51. National Solid Waste Management v. Alabama Dep't. of Envt'l. Management,
729 F.Supp. 792 (N.D. Ala. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2800 (1991); Hazardous
Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991).
52. Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2009 (1992).
53. See South Could Be Dumping Ground For U.S., Landfill Opponent Warns,
ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, September 10, 1990 at D04.
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host community bears the burden of future unknown risks to public
health and the environment, the nuisances accompanying the facility,
and the stigma of becoming the region's dumping ground.'
Growing concern among academics and government officials for the
NIMBY syndrome spawned much literature on solutions to the problem.
The commentators rely heavily on the aforementioned assumptions. The
next section describes the proposed remedies and argues that for the
most part they are ineffective.
C. Solutions for Overcoming Public Opposition
Theorists recommend several solutions to alleviate public
opposition. They are compensation, risk communication, and negotiation
and mediation. The states have enacted siting statutes which allow
public participation to varying degrees and incorporate in part these
theories."
Compensation for the costs incurred in hosting a hazardous waste
facility addresses the assumption that opposition stems from the
inequitable distribution of costs associated with siting facilities.
Theorists suggest that economic incentives could be offered to local
residents so that the perceived benefits would eventually outweigh the
perceived costs.' Massachusetts enacted the 1980 Hazardous Waste
Facility Siting Act 7 which incorporates the compensation theory. The
act prescribes that communities receive negotiated benefits in exchange
for permission to site a facility.
58
54. Respondents' Brief, Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S.Ct. 2009
(1992) (No. 91-471); Morell, supra note 49, at 120-21; MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra
note 42, at 68-72; HOUGHTON, supra note 50, at 4.
55. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-18-15 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130B-11 (1992);
W. VA. CODE § 20-IOA-1 (1992).
56. PORTNEY, supra note 42, at 25.
57. Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act, MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 21D (1992).
58. Lawrence S. Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to
Hazardous Waste Facilities The Massachusetts Approach, in RESOLVING LOCATIONAL
CONFLICT 159, 166-70 (Robert W. Lake ed., 1987); PORTNEY, supra note 42, at 27.
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The compensation theory has had little success in practice. 9 One
study conducted by Kent E. Portney indicates that generally the public
attitude against siting a facility does not change when offered economic
benefits.' One reason could be that when opposition to local siting is
strongly influenced by a perception of the dangers or risks associated,
whether correctly or incorrectly, with hazardous waste treatment
facilities," no amount of compensation can allay fears.
A second remedy promoted in literature is the communication of
risk to the public. Comparing the risks of the newer, safer waste
management facilities with risks generally accepted, i.e. the siting of
industrial complexes, may lessen the public opposition. Again,
commentators have concluded that public education does little to alter
the public's perception of risk.62 "Indeed, given the fact that siting
decisions will probably always engender media interest, there is plenty
of reason to believe that changing risk communication processes can
never fulfill this desired function."3
Finally, some commentators encourage the use of negotiation and
59. While Massachusetts has proceeded further than many other states in the
siting process, the state has not been successful in siting a facility. GREEN, supra
note 3.
60. PORTNEY, supra note 42 at 36-38. ("There is abundant evidence that [economic
benefits] does not and will not work in practice.")(citing Kent E. Portney, CITIZEN
ATTITUDES TOwARD HAZARDOUS FACILITY SITING: PUBLIC OPINION IN FIvE
MASSACHUSETTS COMMUNITIES (1983); Kent E. Portney, Allaying the NIMBY
Syndrome: The Potential For Compensation in Hazardous Waste Treatment Facility,
1 HAZARDOUS WASTE 411 (1984); Kent E. Portney, The Potentional Theory of
Compensation For Mitigating Public Opposition To Hazardous Waste Treatment
Facility Siting: Evidence From Five Massachusetts Communities, 14 POLICY STUDIES
J. 81 (1985); Kent E. Portney, The Perception of Health Risk and Opposition To
Hazardous Waste Treatment Facility Siting: Implications For Hazardous Waste
Management and Policy From Survey Research, in PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
APPLIED GEOGRAPHY CONFERENCES 114 (1986). Contra MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra
note 42, at 166-75.
61. PORTNEY, supra note 42, at 95.
62. PORTNEY, supra note 42, at 38-41.
63. PORTNEY, supra note 42, at 39 (citing Allan Mazur, Communicating Risk In
The Mass Media, in PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF HAZARDOUS TOXIC WASTE DISPOSAL
ON COMMUNITIES (D. Peck ed., 1989)).
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1
mediation.' Some states have adopted this approach while others have
not. The state siting statutes can be described as follows: Several state
governments identify the appropriate site and in some cases obtain and
own the site.' A second approach is to create a state agency or board
that has power to override local decisions to oppose the siting of a
facility. Some of the state boards have members that represent the
community while other state boards have ad hoc members that
represent the affected community. In this case, the state government
does not take over initiative for siting proposals but does intervene to
override local government powers.' The third approach is to vest full
authority to make siting decisions with the local government affected. 7
According to one recent study, neither strong public participation
nor strong state initiative programs are essential to siting success.'
Some elements of public participation in the siting process appear to
promote siting approval and the issuance of permits. 9 However with
the exception of Colorado, no state has successfully sited a commercial
landfill in almost a decade. The aforementioned theories and siting
statutes have not been successful in practice where they are most
needed - incineration and landfilling. In this context, Congress enacted
the CAP provision.
64. MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra note 42, at 176-77; Bacow & Milkey, supra note
58, at 181-83; John J. Pitney, Bile Barrel Politics: 64.1271
Siting Unwanted Facilities, 3 J. POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 446 (1984). See
also Michael E. Kraft & Ruth Kraut, Citizen Participation and Hazardous Waste
Policy Implementation, in DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLITICS AND POLICY
63, 77-78 (Charles E. Davis & James P. Lester, eds., 1988) (suggesting comparative
case studies might illuminate the factors facilitating effective citizen participation).
65. Andrews, supra note 33, at 119; A. Dan Tarlock, State Versus Local Control of
Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: Who Decides in Whose Backyard?, in RESOLvING
LOCATIONAL CONFLICT 137, 142-43 (Robert W. Lake ed., 1987).
66. Andrews, supra note 33, at 119; Tarlock, supra note 65, at 143-46.
67. Andrews, supra note 33, at 119; Tarlock, supra note 65, at 151-53.
68. LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 39.
69. Id.
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III. CAPACITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENT
Congress responded to the growing hazardous waste management
crisis with the Capacity Assurance Plan § 104(c)(9) of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986." The provision requires
each state to submit a capacity assurance plan to the President. The
plan must contain an assurance that the state has sufficient capacity at
hazardous waste facilities to treat and/or dispose of all hazardous waste
reasonably expected to be generated within the next twenty years. The
states must assure capacity is available at facilities within the state or
outside the state according to an interstate agreement, regional
agreement or authority. Finally, the President must find the facilities
acceptable and in compliance with subtitle C of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act.
The statute gives the President broad discretion to determine the
adequacy of the plan. There is no qualifying language in the legislative
history or in the statute to define "adequate." For this reason, the
Environmental Protection Agency's implementation of the provision, to
some extent, is ill-informed. As a result, the implementation of CAPs
has been strained since its inception and has engendered debate in
Congress, in the courts and among the states. The following section
focuses on the scant legislative comments in order to ascertain the
purpose that the provision was meant to fulfill.
70. The statute indicates:
Siting. Effective three years after the enactment of the SARA [October 17, 1989]
the President shall not provide remedial action unless the State in which the
release occurs first enters into a contract or cooperative agreement with the
President providing assurances deemed adequate by the President that the
State will assure the availability of hazardous waste treatment or disposal
facilities which-
(A.) have adequate capacity for the destruction, treatment or secure
disposition of all hazardous wastes that are reasonably expected to be
generated within the State during the 20-year period following the date of
such contract or cooperative agreement and to be disposed of, treated, or
destroyed,
(B.) are within the State or outside the State in accordance with an
interstate agreement or regional agreement or authority,
(C.) are acceptable to the President, and
(D.) are in compliance with the requirements of subtitle C of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act.
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(1986)(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(1988)).
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A. Congressional Intent i
While little legislative discussion on the enactment of the CAP
provision exists, Senator Chafee's comments revealed some objectives
that the Committee intended the provision to serve. First the safe
management of hazardous wastes necessitated the siting of new facilities
which would employ the most modern technologies in waste
treatment.7' That the lack of safe hazardous waste management lead
to illegal disposal of the waste and the creation of future Superfund sites
was an underlying concern of the Committee. 2 Second, due to extreme
political pressure, states were not siting needed new facilities. 3 This
statement captures the major impetus for the enactment of the
provision: "[Tihe broader social need for safe hazardous waste
management facilities often has not been strongly represented in the
siting process. A common result has been that facilities have not been
sited, and there has been no significant increase in hazardous waste
capacity over the past several years."74  Finally, the Committee
71. Federal hazardous waste policy legislation has several goals, two of which are
(1) to bring existing treatment, storage and disposal (TSD) facilities up to minimum
safety levels and then impose progressively higher levels of technology-based
standards on new or expanded TSD facilities. Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988); Tarlock, supra note 65, at 138. To meet these goals and
to provide the safest waste treatment, new facilities must be sited, permitted and put
into operation. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985).
72. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985) ("Recognizing that, as a general
rule, States are not moving aggressively to avoid the creation of future Superfund
sites, an amendment was adopted by the Committee.") Commentators have shared
this view:
Finally, hazardous waste policy makers, legislators, and the public at large
must come to accept the blunt reality that hazardous wastes will be managed.
If not placed in well-designed new treatment facilities and residuals
repositories, then they will go to traditional landfills and surface
impoundments. Or worse yet they will be "managed" via illegal dumping in
sewers, abandoned lots, along roadsides, in people's "front yards."
Morell, supra note 49, at 134; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL DISPOSAL
OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: DIFFICULT To DETECT OR DETER (1985) [hereinafter GAO,
ILLEGAL DISPOSAL].
73. The Committee assumes that states are able to site new facilities but choose
not to due to public opposition. The Committee seeks to remedy this with the denial
of Superfund remedial action funds to those States with inadequate plans. "[Flinally,
the most distressing problem, leadership by government officials is sorely lacking."
S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1985).
74. Id. at 22.
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intended to address the NIMBY syndrome recognizing its history and
continued prevalence across the nation."
The Committee did not explicitly purport to resolve issues of equity
in the siting of hazardous waste facilities." Instead the Committee
emphasized the need for new and expanded treatment facilities and
indicated the lack of representation it received in siting decisions. The
Committee failed to effectively address what characterized the NIMBY
syndrome according to commentators - the issues of equity" and the
public's perception of health risk."8 The lack of insight in this area may
have contributed to the explosive interstate waste disposal controversy
of today.
The Committee intended to provide for additional capacity.
However, the Committee failed to explicitly indicate capacity at which
level-state, regional or national?79 The Committee stated, "[a] site in
every state is not required. In some cases, multi-state efforts may be
appropriate. Use of binding agreements through interstate compacts
guaranteeing access to a facility is only one example of how a State may
provide the requisite assurances. State or local ownership and operation
of facilities or contracts with private facilities may also suffice."8 The
Committee apparently found that capacity at the state level is not
required, but the Committee did not specify whether capacity is sought
75. "Congress failed to anticipate the intensity of the public opposition to new and
expanded waste management.... Yet if the RCRA and Superfund programs are to
work- if public health and the environment are to be protected - the necessary sites
must be made available." Id. at 23.
76. Senator Chafee lists these obstacles to siting new hazardous waste
management facilities:
(1) lack of cooperation among interested parties who distrust one another's
motives and doubt the willingness of the other parties to make any substantial
concessions to alleviate their concerns
(2) lack of reliable, objective criteria or information for evaluating proposals and
sites and citizens' distrust of technical information provided by government or
industry.
(3) insufficient public perception of need for new treatment facilities
Id.
77. MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra note 42, at 22-23; Morell, supra note 49, at 119-
20; PORTNEY, supra note 42, at 41.
78. PORTNEY, supra note 42, at 41.
79. See infra notes 113-19, 124-47 and accompanying text.
80. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985).
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at the regional level or the national level. The Committee portended
that the use of the interstate agreements was a viable means of
satisfying the provision's requirements. Finally, the interstate or
regional agreement was required when a state relies on capacity at
facilities located outside the state to fulfill the CAP requirements.8
In conclusion, the aforementioned statements provide some basis for
an understanding of the CAP provision's purpose as well as some
indication of the type of capacity desired and of the nature of the
interstate agreement. It should be noted that Congress afforded the
President wide discretion to implement the provision. The following
section describes the Environmental Protection Agency's first
implementation.
B. 1988 Directive
The Committee intended that the states enter into a cooperative
agreement with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to satisfy
the requirements of the CAP.82 The Agency normally provides funding
for state remedial actions through state Superfund contracts and
cooperative agreements.' According to the CAP provision, the
Administrator will only enter into contracts or cooperative agreements
with those states that provide assurances regarding the availability of
hazardous waste management facilities for twenty years from the date
of the signature." The Administrator interpreted the legislative history
and the statutory language of the CAP to require states to demonstrate
an understanding of the nature of the waste generated within their
borders and to assure the availability of facilities to manage those
wastes.' Also, the Administrator interpreted the statute to require the
81. Section 104 k(B) of SARA requires states assure the President that available
capacity exists in-state facilities or "[facilities] out of state in accordance with an
interstate agreement or regional agreement or authority." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(B)
(1988). See also BECKER, supra note 50, at 26.
82. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1985).
83. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9611 (1988).
84. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986)(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(1988)).
85. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, ASSURANCE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE CAPACITY: GUIDANCE TO
STATE OFFICIALS, OSV-ER Directive 9010.00 (1988)[hereinafter 1989 GUIDANCE].
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states to assure availability of facilities in their state or out of state in
accordance with an interstate or regional compact.' The Administrator
required the assurances to be based upon the state's commitment to
taking actions necessary to ensure the availability of adequate
management capacity pursuant to its planning documents and in
accordance with its interstate agreements. 7
The EPA instructed the states on what to provide in their CAPs in
the 1988 Assurance of Hazardous Waste Capacity: Guidance to State
Officials. In this directive, the administrator instructed the states that
the CAP should contain four subparts. First, the Administrator required
a detailed description of past (base year) waste generation and
treatment, destruction, and/or disposal capacity available at facilities
within and/or outside the state.' Second, the Administrator required
documentation of any waste minimization efforts that exist or will be
undertaken by the state and/or industry within the state, and detailed
information regarding how any waste minimization efforts will be taken
into account in the projection of waste generation.89 Third, the
Administrator required a projection of generation and available capacity
at facilities within and/or outside the state to treat, destroy, or securely
dispose of waste, including an assessment of capacity shortfalls."
Finally, the Administrator required a description of milestones, such as
permitting facilities if access to additional facilities was necessary, and
descriptions of regulatory, economic, or other barriers that might inhibit
their establishment and operation."
The EPA has wide discretion to determine what the plans should
contain. Based on the Administrator's interpretation of the statute, in
order for the state to understand waste generation, the state should
understand the effects of waste minimization in reducing the need for
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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access to treatment, destruction, and disposal facilities.' Therefore, the
Administrator required the states to determine the amount of all
hazardous wastes generated within the state, including wastes that are
difficult to project or wastes generated on a non-recurrent basis, after
taking into account the effects of future regulatory actions and waste
minimization efforts.
To assist in the preparation of the CAP and to foster interstate
communication and cooperation, the Administrator provided
administrative assistance to the states through their regional offices. In
addition, the Administrator provided technical assistance to the states
recognizing that they will have varying degrees of expertise in data
manipulation. First the EPA provided the states with the Technical
Reference Manual (TRM)93 which described methods for manipulating
the existing data on the type of waste generated. Also, the EPA
provided the states with individualized reports on that state's hazardous
waste management capacity based on the EPA's recent survey,
Treatment, Storage, Disposal and Recycling Survey (TSDR). Finally, the
Agency intended to provide the states with computer software that
would facilitate performing calculations described in the TRM.'
The EPA regional offices evaluated the plans against the following
criteria. First, the plans should form the basis for reasonable assurance
that states have sufficient capacity for waste disposal over the next
twenty years. Second, each state should demonstrate its commitment
to carry out the plan. Finally, the plans should document the
agreements for projected imports and exports of waste to and from other
92. Id.
While Congress did not require waste minimization efforts to lessen the demand
for capacity in the CAP provision, the Administrator gleaned his authority to do so
from the 1984 Hazardous Waste and Solid Waste Amendments to RCRA:
The Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United States
that, wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or
eliminated as expeditiously as possible. Waste that is nevertheless generated
should be treated, stored or disposed of so as to minimize the present and
future threat to human health and the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)(1988).
93. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, TECHNICAL REFERENCE MANUAL FOR
REPORTING THE CURRENT STATUS OF GENERAL MANAGEMENT CAPACITY, IMPORTS AND
EXPORTS (1989).
94. The software was found to be slow, prone to freeze, contained logic errors, and
used a system of rounding data that could create inaccuracies. CAPs Review
Hearings, supra note 6, at 260. See GREEN, supra note 3, at 53-54 (finding that in the
Northeast states the extent and type of use varied).
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states.5 The national headquarters evaluated the plans concurrently
with the regional offices to provide some consistency. In particular, the
EPA directed the regional officers to evaluate the accuracy, completeness
and reasonableness of the plan and to determine whether the states
made a good faith effort to produce high quality data and to reconcile
any inconsistencies in its data and to assess whether the plans to
provide new capacity were realistic and feasible.' The EPA could
approve a plan conditionally provided additional goals, such as plans to
site facilities, to reduce waste, or to enter into an interstate agreement,
were met.97
C. Analysis
Since its inception, the implementation of the CAP provision has
been inhibited by conceptual and procedural problems.98 Confusion
over the goals of the statute hamper successful implementation. The
measuring of hazardous waste and of the available treatment capacity,
in itself, is an unwieldy task. Recent commentators have found
inadequacies with the data measurement, collection and quality control.
1. Generation and Management Data. Studies report that the
procedures for determining capacity assurance were seriously flawed.'
Commentators reported that the procedures lacked information on the
95. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, AGENCY REVIEW OF SARA CAPACITY ASSURANCE PLANS,
OSWER Directive 9010.00a 3 (1989).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See generally, CAPs Review Hearings, supra note 6; GREEN, supra note 3, at
43-72; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: EPA'S GENERATION
AND MANAGEMENT DATA NEED FURTHER IMPROVEMENT (1990)[hereinafter GAO,
HAZARDOUS WASTE]; REGION V, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EXPERIENCES
IN 1989 CAPACITY ASSURANCE PREPARATION (1990)[hereinafter REGION V,
EXPERIENCES]; WESTERN GOVERNORS' As'N, 1990 FINAL REPORT: OBSERVATIONS ON
CAPACITY ASSURANCE THE WESTERN STATES' EXPERIENCE IN IMPLEMENTING CERCLA
§ 104(c)(9) at 24 [hereinafter WGA, FINAL REPORT].
99. GREEN, supra note 3, at 43-72; GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 98;
REGION V, EXPERIENCES, supra note 98, at 1-7; WGA, FINAL REPORT, supra note 98,
at 14-24; CAPs Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 164 (testimony of Robert C.
Fortuna, Hazardous Waste Treatment Council).
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amount of waste present at CERCLA and corrective action sites which
would ultimately require treatment and secure disposal at RCRA-
approved facilities;... the volume of waste that would require
management capacity under proposed regulations-including the large
volume of waste expected from the cleanup of leaking underground
storage tanks;"0 ' and the disposal capacity of salt domes and other
geological formations that are capable of preventing the migration of
waste.' The omission of this information rendered the assessment of
treatment capacity inaccurate.
In addition to the effect that the omission of this information had
on the capacity estimates, inadequate data measurement and collection
procedures also impeded their reliability. In particular, the volume of
each type of waste generated, the type of treatment technologies used,
the total capacity of management technologies, and the degree of waste
minimization were likely to be inaccurate.'0 ' In part, this was due to
the RCRA Biennial Reports, the instruments used in some states to
assess the amount of waste generated."' Respondents were likely to
interpret the measure differently because the RCRA Biennial Report
waste classification mixes independent attributes, thereby creating a
measure which is redundant and complex.' The General Accounting
Office reported in a recent study" that management capacity was well
measured with the exception of the capacity at cement kilns and similar
100. GREEN, supra note 3, at 47; GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 98, at 65;
CAPs Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 164 (testimony of Robert C. Fortuna,
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council).
101. GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 98, at 65.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 79-81; GREEN, supra note 3, at 46; WGA, FINAL REPORT, supra note 98,
at 15-16.
104. GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 98, at 79-81; GREEN, supra note 3, at
46; WGA, FINAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 15-16.
105. "The development of a true general classification system with mutually
exclusive, exhaustive, and hierarchical categories would fully correct the remaining
problem." GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 98, at 80; see also GREEN, supra note
3, at 46; WGA, FINAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 15-16.
106. GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 98.
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forms of incineration.' These measures were not sufficiently specific
to assure that respondents would interpret the question in the same
way.' Misclassification of waste and treatment capacity distorted the
data on specific waste generation and available treatment. This was
particularly relevant when assessing the treatment capacity of cement
kilns and other types of incineration. Incinerators are one of the most
difficult treatment facilities to site," and thirteen Northeastern states
have projected capacity shortfalls for incinerator treatment."' A
liberal estimate of incinerator capacity could thwart the goal of assuring
sufficient treatment.
Furthermore, the measures of waste minimization would not
produce valid data on changes in waste generation per unit of
production."' The GAO reported: "The measures do not account for the
production of different products from one year to the next that may
generate unequal amounts of hazardous waste. The results will be
misleading because incidental changes in production will be mixed with,
and thus will obscure, actual waste minimization.""' Also, states used
varied approaches to estimate waste reduction and measured reductions
differently, both of which made comparison among states difficult."'
Finally, the Administrator did not require the states to use the
same data collection instrument. States used different RCRA Biennial
Reports or state instruments,"4 and some states supplemented the data
with additional information such as hazardous waste generation from
107. Id. at 80.
108. "If respondents assume either unlimited demand for their product or waste
with low heating value, the capacity of this form of incineration could be significantly
overestimated. Some overestimation of capacity is also likely in some versions of this
reporting instrument because some respondents may not have considered permit
restrictions in reporting maximum capacity." Id.
109. LEGISLATIvE COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 40.
110. CAPs Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 41.
111. GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 98, at 83; GREEN, supra note 3, at 44;
REGION V, EXPERIENCES, supra note 98, at 17-18.
112. GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 98, at 80.
113. GREEN, supra note 3, at 65.
114. GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 98, at 83; GREEN, supra note 3, at 44;
REGION V, EXPERIENCES, supra note 98, at 11.
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small quantity generators."' The continued use of data collection
instruments made comparison of states' capacity difficult, if not
impossible, and capacity estimates inaccurate."'
To conclude, the procedures for measuring and collecting data were
inadequate and required revision. The inability to compare the data
from individual states resulted in an unreliable assessment of which
states fall short of sufficient capacity. This was relevant to proposals for
requiring capacity under a national basis. Under such a plan, shortfall
states would be required to create the capacity necessary to meet
national needs; however, enough capacity may not be created. Data that
is both reliable and uniform would be necessary to enforce such a plan.
Also, acting on the basis of inaccurate data could result in the creation
of unneeded capacity or in the case of incinerator treatment, not enough
capacity. Finally, imposing sanctions on the basis of inaccurate data is
morally reprehensible.
Due to the inaccuracies in the system, the EPA improved the
Biennial Report so that it did not mix variables. However, the EPA still
does not require the states ,to use the Biennial Report as a source of
information for their CAPs. The EPA both narrowed and expanded the
scope of the CAPs. The EPA required the states to report on the
Subtitle C hazardous waste including waste from federal facilities and
non-RCRA Subtitle C hazardous waste that is considered hazardous
under state regulations and is managed in hazardous waste
management systems.17 The EPA also required data for on-site, captive,
and commercial facilities for the base year but only required commercial
facility data to be presented for projections. Finally, the EPA excluded
115. GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 98, at 83-85; GREEN, supra note 3, at
53; WGA, FINAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 17-18.
116. GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 98, at 102.
SARA capacity assurance will be seriously impaired because of its reliance on
the RCRA reporting system and the fact that the data from different years and
different data collection efforts will be used. Necessary data will be entirely
missing in states that did not use the revised RCRA reporting system
instrument, and previous measurement problems will persist. The EPA has
attempted to compensate for the missing data by providing states with
assumptions based on engineeringjudgments. However, the EPA acknowledges
that these do not reflect actual state conditions. The resultant uneven quality
of the data will seriously weaken confidence in SARA capacity assurances.
Id.
117. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR CAPACITY ASSURANCE PLANNING, OSWER
Directive No. 9010.02 at 1-16 to 1-17 (1993)[hereinafter 1993 GUIDANCE].
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EPA excluded data on the generation and/or management of waste
generated by small quantity generators; non-RORA waste that may use
Subtitle C hazardous waste management capacity; waste disposed
through discharge to sewers or publicly-owned treatment works; waste
disposed through direct discharge to surface waters under the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System; mixed hazardous/radioactive
wastes; and projections of one-time waste generation. '18 The changes
have made comparisons more equitable; however, some of the
inaccuracies will persist.
2. Provision's Goals. The goals of the capacity assurance
requirement were unclear. Congress intended to provide for "newer,
safer" hazardous waste management facilities;"' however, Congress did
not clarify at which level capacity was desired. Because the provision
made each state responsible for assuring management capacity,
Congress may have intended to provide for capacity at the state level.
However, Congress authorized the use of interstate agreements to assure
adequate capacity and therefore, arguably acquiesced capacity at the
regional level." At least one source has indicated otherwise. The
Department of Justice stated on behalf of the EPA that the capacity
assurance requirement was intended to assure sufficient overall national
capacity so as to allow the national market to continue unfettered."'
The EPA's proposed revisions to the 1993 Directive evidenced their
uncertainty about the clarity of the regulation with regard to the
provision's goals. 1 2' The EPA has since implemented the provision
using a three-phased approach where the Administrator first determines
national-level management capacity shortfalls before requiring shortfall
states to create additional capacity or to reduce waste."'
118. Id.
119. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985); see notes 68-72 and
accompanying text.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9). Senator Chafee stated that "a site in every state is not
required," implying that capacity at the state level is not necessary. S. REP. No. 11,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985).
121. GREEN, supra note 3, at 88 (citing United States Amicus Curiae Brief at 9,
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dept. of Envtl. Management,
910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990)).
122. 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 117.
123. Id.
[Vol. 2
1994] BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL 83
While Congress intended to provide for the necessary hazardous
waste management capacity (although the level of capacity was unclear),
the EPA also interpreted the capacity requirement as a mechanism to
address concerns of equity."4 The EPA found that in order to more
evenly distribute the costs and benefits associated with hazardous waste
management, Congress required the generating states to provide
assurances of adequate capacity.2 ' The EPA reasoned that by doing
so, Congress forced states lacking adequate capacity to site newer, safer
hazardous waste management facilities; to reduce waste generation; or
to enter into interstate agreements which would effectively deal with
capacity shortages." Theoretically, states having sufficient capacity
could refuse to enter into interstate agreements with states unable to
reciprocate."1' As a result, needed capacity would be sited in states
lacking adequate capacity," thereby more equitably distributing the
costs incurred by communities hosting hazardous waste management
facilities.
While the EPA interpreted Congress' intent as one where additional
treatment capacity would be created in an equitable fashion, Congress
did not make this explicit. Instead, Congress emphasized the creation
of newer, safer hazardous waste management to meet the perceived
national capacity crisis. Depending on the level of capacity sought, the
implementation of the capacity assurance requirement can frustrate this
goal as well as raise concerns not anticipated by Congress. For example,
requiring state sufficiency in treatment capacity could create
unnecessary treatment capacity,"' thereby creating a system which
124. 1989 GUIDANCE, supra note 85, at 78.
125. Id.
126. [Plublic opposition to the creation and permitting of facilities that manage
wastes generated in other states is greater than opposition [to the creation
of] facilities designed to manage wastes generated within the same state
or locality. By requiring the generating states to provide assurances of
access to capacity for their own wastes, Congress placed responsibility [of
siting additional facilities] on the states most able to create and to permit
additional capacity. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. GREEN, supra note 3, at 89 ("[Uinder the current state or regional approach,
the CAP process may create artificial capacity shortfalls, since states with facilities
may refuse to join agreements.")
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emphasizes increased treatment capacity rather than waste reduction
and which burdens more communities and the environment.
For certain treatment technologies where adequate national
capacity but state imbalances exist, the CAP requirement had the effect
of creating excess capacity. This is so because the capacity assurance
plans did not reflect actual hazardous waste flows. The states were
required to assure the availability of adequate treatment for all
hazardous waste generated within their borders and for the out-of-state
waste for which the state agreed to provide treatment. 3' Congress did
not require the states to guarantee the availability of capacity, nor did
Congress authorize the states to exert statutory or regulatory control
over the interstate hazardous waste market.' (Attempts to control
the interstate hazardous waste market have consistently been struck
down as violative of the Commerce Clause. " ) The states were only
required to assure adequate treatment capacity for their wastes; they
did not need to incorporate actual waste flows into their plans.
The market dictates where actual hazardous wastes are disposed.
In choosing a specific firm, waste generators presumably consider
the availability of appropriate treatment or disposal technologies,
given the waste type, government regulations, and company
preferences such as waste recovery or recycling; the relative costs
of each waste management option, including shipping, storage,
transportation, and taxes; and the reputation and operational
record of a company, which reflects a generator's concerns about
potential future liabilities. 3'
In certain regions, states may submit plans estimating certain treatment
130. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(1993).
131. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 794-95
(4th Cir. 1991); see also National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't
of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 721-22 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
2800 (1991).
132.. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 910 F.2d at 721 ("A state statute
that erects a barrier to interstate commerce may nonetheless be upheld where
Congress authorizes the state to regulate in such a manner.... Such congressional
intent or authorization for states to affect interstate commerce, however, must be
'expressly stated' and 'unmistakenly clear."'); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council,
945 F.2d 781; Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S.Ct. 2009 (1992); see
also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
133. GREEN, supra note 3, at 89.
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capacity shortfalls which in reality do not exist."" States, however, are
required to create capacity, to reduce waste or to enter into interstate
compacts. If states fail to do so, the EPA is authorized to refuse to
allocate Superfund remedial action funds.' Therefore, the capacity
assurance requirement may have the effect of creating excess capacity.
EPA data suggests that adequate national capacity exists for
hazardous waste."6 However, the EPA has identified major shortfalls
for specific technologies, including solids and sludge incineration."7
Creating capacity for treatment other than incineration or other
treatments with shortfalls unnecessarily burdens citizens and the
environment. Also, additional commercial facilities may be unable to
compete with out-of-state facilities, thereby forcing the state to subsidize
the facility."8 The operation of commercial facilities with low demand
could increase waste management costs. Increased costs and
inaccessibility to commercial facilities might lead to illegal dumping"' -
a practice that Congress wished to curtail.' At worst, states may
simply be unable to maintain a commercially viable facility and fail to
meet the capacity assurance requirements.
Another concern is that the capacity assurance requirement
emphasizes the siting of facilities rather than waste reduction. While
Congress did not intend to allow waste reduction efforts to meet the
134. GREEN, supra note 3, at 90 ("Some studies have found that, although
adequate capacity is available on a national level, regional imbalances may exist.")
(citing Report To EPA Sees Hazwaste Capacity Shortfalls, WASTE AGE, May, 1988, at
154-55; Thomas W. Devine and T. Michael Taimi, Hazwaste Capacity Issues, WASTE
AGE, Sept. 1988, at 50-51).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(1993).
136. Interstate Transportation Hearings, supra note 3, at 80 (statement of Don R.
Clay, Assistant Administrator for Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,
Environmental Protection Agency).
137. Id. at 88-89 (statement by Sylvia K. Lowrence, Director, Office of Solid Waste,
Environmental Protection Agency).
138. GREEN, supra note 3, at 89.
139. See GAO, ILLEGAL DIsPOSAL, supra note 72.
140. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985).
CAPACITY ASSURANCE PLANS
requirements of CAPs,' 4 the EPA incorporated this into its
implementation of the provision."' The creation of additional capacity
may remove incentives for waste generators to reduce waste.' This
could be avoided by requiring states to first find waste reduction
measures to meet capacity assurance requirements and if the state lacks
sufficient capacity, to then require the siting of additional facilities.144
As the waste reduction measures ease the burden of meeting the CAP
requirement, the statute already creates incentives.4 ' State sufficiency
could then foster waste reduction.
Despite the aforementioned concerns, capacity at the state level
advances equitable distribution of the costs associated with the siting of
hazardous waste treatment facilities. Commentators argue that without
utilizing state statutory or regulatory controls, Congress created a
powerful means of forcing equity into the hazardous waste market. 4 '
The capacity assurance requirement threatens noncomplying states with
the loss of Superfund remedial action funding. States with insufficient
capacity must at least site additional facilities, enter into regional
agreements, or minimize waste generation. Because state sufficiency
encourages states to take responsibility for the treatment and disposal
of their wastes, requiring treatment capacity at the state level is a step
in the direction toward ensuring the equitable distribution of the costs
associated with hazardous waste disposal. In turn, this raises a
community's awareness of waste disposal issues and may have the effect
of causing communities to handle their own waste more responsibly or
141. The legislative history and Senator Chafee's remarks do not refer to waste
minimization. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985).
142. 1989 GUIDANCE, supra note 85, at 78.
143. GREEN, supra note 3, at 97.
144. The NGA [National Governors' Association] Work Group on Waste
Minimization and Source Reduction recommended that each state
recognize hazardous waste minimization as the highest priority option for
managing hazardous waste. Members agreed that waste minimization
constitutes sound environmental policy, serving as one of the best ways of
reducing the health and environmental risks associated with hazardous
waste.
DOMENIC FORCELLA, NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, THE ROLE OF WASTE
MINIMIZATION 21 (1989).
145. GREEN, supra note 3, at 97.
146. Id. at 91.
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reduce their waste generation.
In order for the provision to address equity concerns, it must compel
states with insufficient capacity to provide for additional capacity. To
do so, the imposition of sanctions is necessary. The provision threatens
non-compliers with the loss of Superfund remedial action funding.
Commentators and legislators have questioned the use of such a drastic
penalty.'47 The withholding of Superfund monies will not protect the
environment and may not guarantee sufficient capacity in the future.
The question of what degree of non-compliance warrants the imposition
of so severe a sanction has not been answered.
Requiring capacity at the regional level strikes a balance between
the aforementioned concerns. Again, certain regions may lack capacity
for a treatment technology for which overall national capacity exists.
Although this will likely lead to the creation of excess capacity, it will
force the equitable distribution of treatment facilities within a region.
This will inevitably lessen the burden on communities currently hosting
commercial hazardous waste facilities because shortfall states will be
required to site additional facilities or lessen waste flow and in turn,
this will have an effect on the market.
The CAP provision could encourage regional capacity and equitable
distribution at this level. Regional agreements appear to work best
where the regional market has already created sufficient capacity.'48
The Western Governors' Association formed a regional agreement and
was highly successful in developing mutually acceptable solutions to its
interstate waste problems.149 In contrast, Green found that the
inequitable distribution of costs and benefits was at the core of New
York's decision not to join the Northeastern States regional
agreement.' Presently, the provision does not require states with
adequate capacity to enter into interstate agreements. The incentives
to join a regional agreement are diminished when states with adequate
capacity are faced with inequitable distribution of the costs incurred
when joining one. While the regional capacity requirement may work
147. CAPs Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 282; GREEN, supra note 3, at 96.
148. CAPs Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 281 (Testimony of Sylvia K.
Lowrence, Director, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Environmental
Protection Agency.) ("They [Western Governor's Association] tend to be a captive
group; they don't ship a lot of waste out of the region, so they are able to get closer
and closer over time...to real flows and real needs.")
149. Id. at 190.
150. GREEN, supra note 3, at 92.
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well with captive regions, such as the Western states' region, the
interstate agreement fails in regions similar to the Northeast. The
Northeast region must site additional commercial landfills to
compensate for New York's refusal to enter into the agreement, thereby
forcing equity into the market.
Finally, requiring capacity at a national level provides the least
interference with the hazardous waste market. There is no threat that
excess capacity will be created. However, implementation of the CAP
provision on a national basis fails to address equity concerns.
Communities such as Western New York and Emelle, Alabama, which
host commercial landfills with capacity that lasts until the next
millennium will continue to be burdened by the costs of disposing of the
nation's hazardous wastes.15 1
IV. RESOLVING THE INTERSTATE HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROVERSY
The tension between equitable distribution of the costs and benefits
of hazardous waste treatment and the creation of efficient, economical
and accessible hazardous waste treatment is not easily resolved. The
two interests are at odds with each other. The dispersement of
treatment facilities will most likely result in excess capacity. However,
it will instill equitable distribution of hazardous waste treatment and
disposal facilities. State attempts to instill equity in a concentrated
hazardous waste market are already constrained by the Commerce
Clause, and the current revision to the capacity assurance provision
wholly fails to address these concerns. The following section describes
the legal constraints on the state attempts to control the hazardous
waste market and argues that these constraints and the revision to the
CAP requirement impose upon Western New York the burden of being
the nation's hazardous waste dump. To conclude, this section argues
that a revision of the capacity assurance requirement which strikes a
balance between these two competing interests is the best mechanism
for resolving this debate.
A. Legal Restraints on States
1. Commerce Clause. States have attempted to control the
interstate hazardous waste market in order to assure capacity and to
create equity. State protectionist measures have taken the form of
import bans, differential fees and reciprocal compacts. However, the
151. See Powers, supra note 16.
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executive orders that discriminate against hazardous waste on the basis
of state origin violate the Commerce Clause. While the restraints
imposed on the states cannot be found in the express words of the
Commerce Clause, the bounds of the restraints have emerged from case
law.
In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,"2 the Court defined the test to be
applied when weighing the validity of statutes which affected interstate
commerce. The Court held that where the statute regulates
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local interest and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
local benefits.153 The extent of the burden tolerated will depend on the
nature of the local interest and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.' The Court applied this
test in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,"' and found
unconstitutional a statute which prohibited the importation of most
"solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the
territorial limits of the State."56 The Supreme Court adhered to the
reasoning that "our economic unit is the Nation...as its corollary...the
states are not separable economic units."57 The principle is that one
state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of
economic isolation.'58 However, the Supreme Court did not find this
case dispositive on the facts of whether the legislation was meant as an
economic protectionist device or a safeguard. Instead, because New
Jersey discriminated against articles of commerce based solely on the
state of origin, the Supreme Court found the statute per se invalid.'
Recently, in National Solid Waste Management v. Alabama
152. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
153. Id. at 142.
154. Id.
155. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
156. Id. at 617-18.
157. Id. at 623.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 627.
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Department of Environmental Management,16 the Court of Appeals
struck down an Alabama statute, the "Holley Bill."'6 1 It prohibited an
owner or operator of a commercial hazardous waste facility located
within the state from treating or disposing of hazardous waste generated
in a state other than Alabama, if the other state either prohibited the
treatment or disposal of hazardous waste within its borders and had no
facility for such; or had no facility existing within that state for the
treatment or disposal of hazardous waste; or had not entered into a
regional agreement for the disposal or treatment of hazardous waste to
which Alabama was a signatory. "6 ' The statute further prohibited
commercial waste management facilities in Alabama from contracting
with a state other than Alabama to satisfy that state's capacity
assurance obligation.'63 Again, the Court of Appeals recognized that
when the dangers inherent in an object's movement "far outweigh" its
worth in interstate commerce, a state can prohibit transportation of the
object across state lines." However, following the holding in
Philadelphia, the Court of Appeals found the "Holley Bill" to violate the
Commerce Clause by prohibiting the importation of hazardous wastes
into Alabama because it was a barrier to interstate commerce and
discriminated on the basis of origin.' Moreover, the Court did not
find an express authorization by Congress to allow the restriction on
interstate commerce by enacting the SARA amendments to CERCLA. '6
Similarly, in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South
Carolina,'67 the Court of Appeals struck down two South Carolina
statutes, executive orders and a regulation. One statute required South
Carolina hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities to give
preference to in-state generators and prohibited owners or operators of
160. 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2800 (1991).
161. Ala. Code § 22-30-11 (Supp. 1989).
162. National Wastes Management, 910 F.2d at 717 n.7.
163. Id. at 717.
164. Id. at 720-21. This exception is commonly referred to as the quarantine cases
which have upheld state legislation that facially discriminates against out-of-state
commerce involving articles that were highly dangerous. Id.
165. Id. at 720-21.
166. Id. at 720.
167. 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991).
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hazardous waste treatment facilities within South Carolina from
accepting waste generated in a state which has not entered into an
interstate or regional agreement for the safe treatment of hazardous
waste pursuant to federal CERCLA.'" The other statute required that
a hazardous waste facility operator obtain a permit and limit the
amount of hazardous material that could be buried. In addition, the
operator was required to reserve the same capacity to dispose of
hazardous waste generated in South Carolina that was disposed of in
the previous year.'69 The executive order required in-state disposal
facilities to reserve a portion of the cap of total hazardous waste buried
annually.1 ' Finally, the regulation required applicants for the
expansion or establishment of treatment facilities for hazardous wastes
to demonstrate need; however need could not be based upon hazardous
waste generated outside South Carolina.17" ' Although the laws did not
ban out of state hazardous wastes, the Court of Appeals found the laws
to facially discriminate against objects of commerce on the basis of
origin, thereby erecting a barrier against interstate movement. 7'
South Carolina failed to show that prohibiting the burying of out-of-state
wastes advanced the health and safety interests of the people of South
Carolina when the burying of in-state wastes created the same danger.
Finally, in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt,7' the
Supreme Court struck another Alabama act that imposed an additional
fee on out-of-state hazardous wastes that are disposed of in-state.
Chemical Waste Management also challenged a fee on all hazardous
wastes generated and disposed of in Alabama. The Supreme Court
refused to review the Court of Appeals decision that the evenhandedly
applied fee was constitutional. In accordance with the aforementioned
cases, the Supreme Court held the differential tax to be invalid.
Alabama had not met the burden of showing the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local
168. Id. at 785.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 786.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 790-92.
173. 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
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interests."74 The Court indicated that a per-mile tax on all vehicles
transporting such waste across state roads or an evenhanded cap on the
total tonnage landfilled at the commercial landfill would curtail the
volume from all sources as the localities wished and thus alleviated their
concerns by less discriminatory means.'75
Alabama asserted that the CAP provision requires assurances, and
therefore, states have legitimate state concerns to burden interstate
commerce.'76 In response, the Court in National Waste Management
found nothing in the SARA Cap provision that evidence a Congressional
intention for each state to be able to close its borders to wastes
generated in other states in order to force those states to meet the
federally mandated hazardous waste management requirements.'
The Court stated, "If Congress intended to allow the states to restrict
the interstate movement of hazardous wastes as Alabama has tried to
do, Congress could (and still can) plainly say so."'7 8 Because state
attempts to control the hazardous waste market have been consistently
struck down as unconstitutional, revision of the capacity assurance
requirement would best instill equity into the hazardous waste market.
2. Enforcement Suits. New York State has brought a suit against
William K. Reilly in his capacity as Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency to compel defendant to perform his non-discretionary
duties under 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (c)(9). 79 New York State contends that
the EPA continues to provide monies to states which the EPA has
determined do not have adequate availability of facilities in derogation
of its mandatory duty to withhold such funds.8' The suit survived,
among other motions, defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted."' The court applied the rule
174. Id. at 2015.
175. Id. at 2013.
176. National Solid Waste Management, 910 F.2d at 720.
177. Id. at 721.
178. Id. at 721-22.
179. New York v. Reilly, 143 F.R.D. 487 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief.182 The
court held that the plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to maintain a
cause of action under sections 9659 and 9604(c)(9). 183 The court added
its concern about whether plaintiffs upon further discovery would be
able to present sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for summary
judgment.
The use of enforcement suits to compel the EPA to sanction
noncomplying states as a means of instilling more equitable distribution
of treatment facilities is probably not a viable option. Although the
Director of the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response testified
as to having personal concerns as to the efficacy of the sanction and
indicated that preliminary discussions had occurred with regard to the
EPA's authority to impose tiered sanctions,'84 there is little evidence
that the EPA failed to carry out its mandated duties. The provision
grants the EPA wide discretion to determine if the states' CAPs are
adequate. Practicalities dictate that the EPA allow the states abundant
time to create new capacity as the process for siting facilities continues
for years as well as the promulgation and implementation of new
regulations, i.e. waste reduction measures.
Even if some states have failed to meet their milestones, precedent
holds that when a court reviews an agency's actions pursuant to an
ambiguous law, the court should defer to the agency's answers."5 Also,
discretion is committed to an agency when the statute is written so that
the court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency's exercise of discretion.'86 This is applicable to the CAP
provision. Before any sanctions can be imposed the Administrator must
find the CAP inadequate. No qualifying language in the legislative
history or by Senator Chafee informs the court's understanding of
"adequate." Again considering the complexity of the task of determining
capacity, the court would have to defer to the agency.
182. Id. at 15886.
183. Id. at 15888.
184. CAPs Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 282.
185. Contract Courier Services Inc. v. Research and Special Programs Admin., U.S.
Dep't. of Transportation, 924 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir. 1991).
186. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a)(2); Animal Legal Defense
Fund v. Madigan, 781 F.Supp. 797, 800 (D.D.C.1992).
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The use of enforcement suits is not a viable means of providing
equity in the hazardous waste disposal market. Revision of the capacity
assurance statute is the best method of addressing this issue. The
following section analyzes some of the solutions offered to solve the
issue.
B. Analysis Of Proposed Solutions
1. Import Bans, Differential Fees and Regional Compacts. Several
solutions to revise the CAP provision have been proposed. Generally,
these include: authorizing states to restrict the transportation of
hazardous waste from out-of-state generators; 8 ' authorizing states to
deny permits for hazardous waste facilities when capacity from that
state in which they are located is insufficient;' 8 authorizing regions to
ban hazardous waste imports pursuant to a regional compact;'89 and
authorizing states to impose fees on hazardous waste imported from out-
of-state.'90 While these proposals may force equity into the hazardous
waste market, they neglect concerns of excess capacity and may
inadvertently create a more complex system as they involve controls on
the actual hazardous waste flows. This section will analyze the
proposals for their effectiveness in addressing equity concerns within the
confines of the hazardous waste market.
The proposals advocating bans or restrictions on the importation of
hazardous waste force treatment capacity at the state level. State
controls foreclose treatment options causing states lacking certain
treatment capacity to site additional facilities. If demand for a
particular hazardous waste treatment technology is low, state
subsidy'9 ' or increased prices may be necessary. The latter may result
187. S. 592, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991); H.R. 607, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. §
2 (1991); H.R. 2216, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991).
188. S. 443, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(7) (1993); S. 592, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2 (1991).
189. Jonathon Stone, Supremacy and Commerce Clause Issues Regarding State
Hazardous Waste Import Bans, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 29-30 (1990).
190. S. 443, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1993).
191. GREEN, supra note 3, at 91.
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in illegal dumping" - a practice Congress intended to curtail.93
Finally, the use of bans or restrictions is counterproductive to waste
reduction. States cannot both encourage waste minimization and
maintain demand for hazardous waste treatment facilities sited within
the state after out-of-state capacity has been foreclosed.'94
The use of restrictions or bans on imported hazardous waste
disperses the costs associated with hazardous waste disposal. The state
controls would advance state sufficiency and may lessen public
opposition to siting these facilities.195 While the measures address
equity concerns, their use may have undesirable consequences for the
market and for policy. Therefore, the CAP provision should not be
revised to authorize states to ban or restrict imports.
The proposal authorizing states to impose differential fees on out-of-
state waste has similar consequences. If fees on out-of-state waste are
set high enough, they, in effect, act as a ban or act to severely restrict
the flow of hazardous waste. Differential fees can divert the waste
market away from the state imposing the tax. Theoretically, if all states
engaged in imposing differential fees, generators might create demand
for facilities within the state in which they operate, thereby creating
excess capacity. This excess capacity is subject to the problems
mentioned above. At any: rate, differential fees have the effect of
increasing management costs which, again, may lead to illegal
dumping." I
On the other hand, differential fees could address other concerns of
host communities. The tax forces some waste generators to utilize less
expensive treatment elsewhere. Also, the revenue obtained from the fees
might provide some compensation to the host state for potentially
adverse environmental effects and the additional oversight that results
192. Interstate Transportation Hearings, supra note 6, at 82 (Statement of Don R.
Clay, Assistant Administrator for Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,
Environmental Protection Agency).
193. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985).
194. See Louis J. Thibodeaux, Hazardous Material Management In The Future, 24
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 456 (1990) (proposing that complete waste recycling is
impossible).
195. GREEN, supra note 3, at 92; see LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 40
(finding off-site facilities more difficult to site than on-site facilities).
196. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
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from managing imported waste."' Compensation may serve to assuage
state governments for enduring the political consequences of siting new
facilities more frequently than would be necessary for exclusively in-
state wastes.' Reasonable differential fees have potential to alleviate
some equity concerns within the constraints of the hazardous waste
market.
Another proposal is to authorize states to enter into compacts which
can restrict the flow of interstate hazardous waste.1" This differs from
the CAP provision in that states are only authorized to plan for
hazardous waste pursuant to their regional compacts."0 By altering
the actual flow of hazardous waste, regions redistribute the costs of
housing hazardous waste facilities. Also, regional demand for specific
technologies is likely to be greater than any one state's demand.
Therefore, additional facilities that need to be sited in a region tend to
be commercially viable. While regional compacts may tend to create
excess capacity in certain treatment technologies, this will occur to a
much lesser extent than excess capacity generated under a state
sufficiency requirement. However, formal compacts have been criticized
for their lack of flexibility.'' Once compacts are established, regions
may exclude states regardless of their efforts to create additional
capacity.20
2
197. Interstate Transportation Hearings, supra note 3, at 82. But see PORTNEY,
supra note 42, at 25 (discussing the ineffectiveness of the compensation theory); see
supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
198. Interstate Transportation Hearings, supra note 3, at 82.
199. For a comparison of formal interstate compacts and CAPs interstate
compacts, see Wynne & Hamby, supra note 23, at 632-33; Stone, supra note 189, at
29-30.
200. That Congress expressly authorized the use of import bans for states
pursuant to approved interstate compacts pursuant to the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act 42, U.S.C. § 2021 (1988), supports the contention that Congress did
not intend the same result for CERCLA § 9604(c)(9). National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 721-22 (11th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2800 (1991).
201. Interstate Transportation Hearings, supra note 6, at 82 (Statement of Don R.
Clay, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,
Environmental Protection Agency).
202. Id.
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2. National Capacity Basis. The EPA revised the Capacity
Assurance Plan Guidance to the States.23 The EPA now requires a
three-phased approach to assessing treatment capacity.0 4 Under the
new approach, the EPA will make an initial national-level determination
of shortfalls in management capacity."5 At the first phase, states will
only be required to submit base year data on generation of wastes and
on management capacity and their projections over a twenty-year
period.2" The EPA will then conduct a national capacity assessment
to determine whether sufficient hazardous waste exists nationwide for
the twenty-year projection period for each CAP Management
Category.0 " If adequate national capacity exists for all CAP
Management Categories, then the EPA will not require Phase 2
submissions from the states.00 If national shortfalls are projected for
any CAP Management Category, each state that the EPA identifies as
a "shortfall state" for that CAP Management Category must address its
portion of the net national shortfall by siting additional facilities,
reducing waste generation or entering into interstate agreement.2"
This directive addresses the concerns of excess capacity by requiring
only that capacity which is needed. The plan better reflects actual
waste flows than did the 1989 Guidance. However, if adequate national
capacity exists, with the! exception of one or two Management
Categories, this proposal will result in the dispersing of only one or two
specific types of hazardous waste management facilities.210 This
203. 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 117.
204. 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 117, at 1-7.
205. Id. at 1-10 to 1-14.
206. Id. at 1-12.
207. Id. at 1-13 to 1-14. CAP Management Categories include: Metals Recovery;
Solvents Recovery; Other Recovery; Incineration-liquids; Incineration-sludges/solids;
Energy Recovery-kilns, boilers, furnaces; Aqueous Inorganic Treatment; Other
Treatment (e.g. pretreatment including settling and neutralization); Sludge
Treatment; Stabilization; Land Treatment; Landfill; Deepwell (underground)
Injection; Other Disposal. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 31, at 5.
208. 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 117, at 1-15.
209. Id.
210. Interstate Transportation Hearings, supra note 6, at 88-89; see supra notes
136-37.
CAPACITY ASSURANCE PLANS
directive, therefore, fails to address equity concerns and continues to
impose the burden of hosting commercial hazardous waste upon Western
New York and other communities similarly situated.
A system which requires capacity at the regional level best
addresses all concerns and alleviates some of the burden on communities
like Western New York. This strategy, arguably, may convince a
recalcitrant state or community to host a private facility that would
accept local as well as imported wastes."' The sense that the
community is accepting some costs, that of hosting the facility, in return
for some benefit, the use of other management technologies located
elsewhere, underlies this strategy. Under the present system, states are
given the opportunity to address equity issues using the aforementioned
strategy through interstate agreements. The revision does not
emphasize the sharing of the treatment facilities and therefore
magnifies the perception of inequity. Once national capacity for a
Management Category is deemed adequate, consideration of which states
are providing the capacity for that Category is irrelevant.
Most important, there exist treatment technologies that provide
adequate national capacity but overburden too few states. Commercial
hazardous waste landfills exemplify this.21 The revision does not
provide incentive for states to more evenly distribute the costs associated
with hosting such facilities. To conclude, the proposal to assess capacity
on a national basis fails to attend to equity concerns.
C. Statutory and Regulatory Reform
The CAP provision and implementation require revision in order to
balance the competing interests of equitable distribution of the costs of
hazardous waste disposal and the creation of economical, efficient
capacity. Establishing capacity at the regional level best effectuates this
needed balance. Statutory or regulatory reform requiring capacity at the
regional level provides for more equitable distribution of treatment
facilities while having the potential of creating less excess capacity than
a state sufficiency requirement would engender. In addition, the
likelihood that demand will be sufficient to maintain a facilities'
commercial viability is greater at the regional level than at the state
level.
To effectuate these changes, Congress must revise the capacity
assurance requirement. Formal regional compacts which ban hazardous
waste are not necessary. A provision which requires states with
211. GREEN, supra note 3, at 93.
212. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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shortfall capacity to site needed facilities will influence the hazardous
waste market regardless of whether the states have controls on the
market. Also, the perception of equity will be enhanced.
In addition, Congress must authorize the EPA to create a tiered
level of sanctions where states failing to meet milestones will be
penalized gradually.213 This will retain the credibility of the provision.
Finally, the EPA needs to create a data measurement and collection
procedure that provides uniform and reliable data. The EPA should
require all states to use the same updated bienni al report instrument as
a source of waste generation. Reliable data is crucial to the efficacy of
the CAPs' goals.
V. CONCLUSION
The interstate hazardous waste controversy has only intensified
with the enactment of the capacity assurance requirement. Increasing
public opposition to the siting of facilities and diminished capacity in
certain treatment technologies suggest that the problem will increase for
Western New York. The equitable distribution of the costs of hazardous
waste disposal and the creation of efficient, economical treatment
facilities are the two competing interests that must be balanced to
resolve the controversy and to lessen the burden for communities like
Western New York. The capacity assurance requirement provides the
best mechanism to accomplish this goal; however, the present provision
does not adequately address equity concerns. Statutory or regulatory
reform which requires capacity at a regional level provides for equitable
distribution of the costs associated with hazardous waste facilities and
for safe, economical and efficient hazardous waste treatment facilities.
213. See GREEN, supra note 3, at 96.

